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Abstract 
The role and importance of solidarity for effective health provision is the  
subject of lengthy and heated debate which has been thrown into even sharper 
relief by the Covid-19 pandemic. In various ways, and by various authorities 
we have all been asked, even instructed, to engage in solidarity with one 
another in order to collect ively respond to the current crisis. Under normal 
circumstances, individuals can engage in solidarity with their compatriots in 
the context of public health provision in a number of ways, including paying 
taxes which fund welfare state initiat ives, and avo iding others when ill .  
While there has been significant engagement in solidarity worldwide, there 
have also been high profile examples of refusals and failures to engage in 
solidarity,  both by individual agents, and governments.  
In this paper I examine the  consequence of these failures with reference to 
the actions of the current British government, which has failed to deliver an 
effective response to the crisis . This failure has effectively devolved 
responsibility for responding to the crisis to people who are simultaneously 
more vulnerable to infection, and less able to do anything about it .  I argue 
that such responses represent not only mismanagement of a public h ealth 











While the role and importance of solidarity has been the focus of long -
running and extensive debate surrounding public health ethics and 
practice, (1)  the Covid-19 pandemic has cast this debate into even starker 
relief. (2)  In doing so, it  has emphasised the particular importance of 
solidarity for the delivery of effective public health programmes by 
highlighting the potentially disastrous consequences of its absence. In this 
paper I examine these consequence with reference to the response  of the 
current British government to Covid-19 which failed to deliver an effective 
public health response to the crisis . I argue that this response represents not 
only mismanagement of a public health crisis, but also a rejection of 
important democratic norms and values.  
Defining Solidarity  
Solidarity has a wide range of definit ions in academic discourse, with its 
precise features being the subject of heated debate. (3 ,4 )  Historically,  
solidarity has been seen as emerging most readily,  and most often between 
persons sharing relatively stable, deeply ingrained qualit ies,  such as shared 
membership of a state or religious group, (5)  or commitment to shared 
political ideals and objectives. (6 ,7)  More recently,  it  has been suggested that  
more transient, or less deeply ingrained features of persons may serve as the 
basis for acts of solidarity,  and at least short term solidarity relationships. (4)  
On a larger scale, it  has also been suggested that recognition of shared 
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vulnerability in the face of global threats to health, such as climate change 
and antimicrobial resistance, may serve as a catalyst for solidarity between 
nations and peoples. (8)  As I explain below, this perspective is particularly 
relevant to the current pandemic context. (2)  
In this paper I rely mainly on the definit ion of solidarity offered by Prainsack 
and Buyx, who define solidarit y as “enacted commitments to accept costs  to 
assist others with whom a person or persons recognise similari ty in a relevant 
respect”. (4)  Therefore, solidarity describes what it  is that we do when we 
assist, benefit , or support other people because we recognise some form of 
relevant similarity or connection with/to them. Thus solidarity is active ,  in 
that it  is something we do, not merely a feeling or atti tude. It is also 
egalitarian, with motivation for action being grounded in recognition of what 
is shared  between parties, not in what distinguishes them. (3)  Finally, acting 
in solidarity also involves incurring of costs of some kind, though  these may 
be extremely minimal, or be counterbalanced by the benefits of a given 
solidarity action.  
Prainsack and Buyx argue that there are three main “tiers” of solidaristic 
action; interpersonal, group, and institutional solidarity. (4)  The first of these 
tiers describes what happens between individual persons. For example,  
Prainsack and Buyx suggest  that giving up one’s seat on a crowded bus for a 
pregnant fellow passenger is an act of solidari ty when based on recognition 
of shared experience of discomfort while standing during pregnancy. (4)  The 
second tier “comprises manifestations of a shared commitment to carry costs 
to assist others with whom people consider themselves bound together 
through at least one similarity in a relevant respect”. These group  solidarities 
occur when many individuals share a similar specific context, and engage in 
actions to benefit others with whom the context is  shared. Such solidarity is  
informal,  though i t may also be heavily normalised within a given 
community,  such that i t  forms an expectation of behaviour.  
Tier three solidarity comprises formalised, or legally mandated expectations 
of behaviour. Here,  solidarity is fully institutionalised, “in the form of 
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legally enforceable norms”, (4)  such as progressive tax systems and  welfare 
state arrangements.  For example, the British National Health Service 
exemplifies institutionalised solidarity, because it is funded through taxation 
and provides health care to cit izens and legal residents of the United 
Kingdom, regardless of thei r ability to pay. According to Prainsack and 
Buyx, these three tiers of solidarity are closely connected, with tier three 
solidarity typically emerging from solidarity at tiers one and two. 
Correlatively, Sangiovanni discusses the participation in collabor ative 
institutions as solidaristic practice when he argues that solidarity is grounded 
in “our joint action as authors of political and social institutions” . (7)  Thus, 
for Sangiovanni solidarity is something which emerges from shared 
participation in the construction and enactment of civic society. Solidarity 
can therefore be interpreted in a range of ways –  as the act of carrying costs 
for relevantly similar others, ‘“standing up for”, “standing up with”, and  
“standing up as”’ those persons with whom solida rity is identified, (3 )  or the 
act of working together for a shared goal. (7)  Regardless of the precise 
definit ion adopted, at least basic solidarity,  as active engagements in 
interpersonal and/or institutional egalitarian relationality,  by all or most 
members of a group is fundamentally necessary for the existence and 
functioning of any community –  as I explain below, it  is particularly 
important in democracies.  
Solidarity and Public Health  
In normal circumstances, private individuals can engage in interpersonal and 
group solidarity in the context of public health provision, by avoiding social  
interaction when sick and helping others to do the same, by purchasing  
groceries for an ill  neighbour for example. Individuals can engage in tier 
three solidarity by participating in institutions which promote and protect  
public and individual health. For example, part icipation in fair taxation 
schemes can help fund health and welfare programmes, such as the British 
National Health Service (NHS), ensuring the acces sibility of these services to 
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all members of a given community, thereby contributing to public health and 
individual wellbeing.  
Correlatively, while elected and appointed governmental officials, such as 
cabinet ministers, can also engage in solidarity in the same way as their 
constituents, they also have addit ional responsibilities in virtue of their  
public role and status as elected representatives of their communities .  These 
responsibilities include things like enacting legislation which establishes and 
maintains institutions and programmes which promote and protect health.  
Such actions not only protect  the health of their constituents,  they also 
enable those constituents to more effectively engage in solidarity with their 
peers, by providing the systems necessary to do so most effectively,  and 
guidance as to the reasons for so doing. It is therefore particularly important 
that elected officials engage in solidarity with their constituents  in this 
manner because individual citizens lack the capacity to establish and govern 
public health institutions, and more importantly,  have deferred authority to 
do these things to those in government through the democratic process.  
The delivery and maintenance of effective public health programmes relies on 
most members of a community engaging in solidarity in a range of ways. To 
illustrate, vaccination programmes cannot deliver herd immunity without 
mass participation from community members, but individuals cannot 
contribute to herd immunity if vaccines are prohi bitively expensive, or only 
available at an inaccessible venue . They are also unlikely to contribute if  
they have been misled into believing that  vaccines are dangerous or 
unnecessary.  Here, engagement in solidarity is required from both private 
individuals, who must participate in the programme, and elected officials, 
who must ensure i t is accessible to all members of a community, and provide 
an epistemic context in which the importance and safety of the programme is 
widely understood, in order for it  to b e effective.   
Solidarity and Covid-19 
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In his opening remarks to a press briefing on the 18
t h
 of March 2020, Tedros 
Adhanom Ghebreyesus,  Director-General  of the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) stated that  “[the] spirit  of solidarity must be at  the centre of  our 
efforts to defeat COVID-19”. (2)  Similar statements have also been made by a 
number of other agencies,  each of which have emphasised solidarity’s role as 
an essential part of an effective public health response. (9 )  Correlatively,  
many governments have instituted lockdowns, and are enforcing social  
distancing measures (to greater or lesser extent ) in order to limit the spread 
of infection. We have all thereby been asked, even instructed, to avoid public 
gatherings, minimise our contact with others, and help to protect our 
neighbours. In so doing, we engage in solidarity with our compatriots.  
For private individuals,  engaging in solidarity with their peers in response to 
Covid-19 is thus very similar to such engagement for public health under 
normal circumstances –  part icipation in public health programmes, social  
distancing, community cooperation, and contributing through taxation to the 
cost of public health efforts and medical research. Elected officials can do 
these things as individuals , but can also respond in their role as public 
officials in at least two addit ional ways; first, by collabo rating with other 
governments to share information, and coordinate regional and global public 
health responses. (10)  Second, by ensuring that national health services exist 
and are adequately funded, staffed and equipped to be able to respond to the 
pandemic, and by providing clear information and support to citizens so that 
they may engage in solidarity with one another.  
There has been great variation in the extent to which different regions have 
achieved engagement in solidarity across these vectors; New Zealand and 
South Korea both implemented thorough testing and tracing programmes 
which allowed them to counteract the spread of infection (and in South 
Korea, also reduced influenza infections), while New Zealand also imposed 
strict lockdown protocols, going as far as closing i ts borders. (11,  12)  Equally 
importantly,  officials in both locations acted quickly,  and communicated 
clearly with their communities, ensuring that residents knew how to minimise 
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the risk of transmission, and why doing so was important . Individual 
members of these communities were thus able to engage in interpersonal 
solidarity, by following lockdown rules, maintaining social distancing, and 
participating in track and trace programmes, because their governments had 
proactively established the material  and epistemological conditions where 
such engagement was enabled, empowered and encouraged. By doing so, the 
New Zealand and South Korean governments thus engaged in solidarity with 
their constituents.  
In contrast , the current British government’s response to Covid -19 lacked the 
transparency, clarity, and urgency which characterised the actions of these 
more successful nations.  First,  while the UK and New Zealand each initiated 
lockdowns in the same week in late March, New Zealand at  th at stage had 
only 102 cases of Covid-19, with no deaths, compared to the UK’s total of 
5687 cases, and 281 deaths. (12, 13) Correlatively,  while South Korea did not 
enforce a strict  lockdown, it  had enacted social distancing policies even 
earlier, at the end of February. (11) The risk of ongoing transmission was 
therefore significantly higher in the UK than in either nation at this t ime .  
Second, communication from the current British government  was often 
unclear, and the Prime Minister and other officials frequently downplayed the 
severity of the pandemic –  at one point  the Prime Minister (who was later 
hospitalised with Covid-19) stated that  he would not refrain from shaking 
hands,  and that he had recently shaken hands with everyone in a Covid -19 
ward.(14)  In this way, the risks of Covid-19 were initially minimised in 
official  communications, creating uncertainty about how to act, and which 
guidance to follow. Exacerbating this issue, where advice was  given, i t  was 
initially often discretionary, and litt le material support was made available to 
enable people to follow it. For example, on the 16
t h
 March 2020, people were 
advised to work from home if  possible  and avoid social  venues,  such as pubs 
and theatres. (15)  However, this was not mandatory, and social venues were 
not required to close until the 20
t h
 of March, so some employees were 
required to work onsite,  despite known risks. (16)   
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Correlatively, no support was initially made available to those who could not 
work remotely,  meaning that choices had to be made between employment 
and “fighting the virus”. Financial support was later made available, in the 
form of the government’s job retention scheme, which allowed employers to 
furlough non-essential workers, the wages of whom would be subsidised by 
government. (17)  However,  this only covered 80% of employee wages,  
meaning that many of those furloughed would have to live on a reduced 
income. Likewise,  while support has been offered to homeowners in the form 
of mortgage holidays, at the time of writing, renters have not received similar 
assistance. (18)   
Third,  the government also initially moved to adopt a strategy that  deviated 
from the recommendations of the W orld Health Organisation (WHO), which 
focused on minimising infection rates through conventional public health 
measures, such as active testing, social distancing, and increased emphasis on 
personal hygiene (hand washing etc). (19) In contrast, the government 
initially endorsed a “herd immunity” strategy, which appeared to focus on 
allowing approximately 60% of the Brit ish population to become infected 
with the virus, which would have led to an even higher level of excess 
mortality. (20)  Despite the eventual rejection of this strategy in favour of 
closer adherence to WHO guidelines, at the time of writing the UK has the 
world’s second highest Covid -19 mortality rate. (21)  Further, the consequences 
of these policy choices were compounded because of the historica l policy 
context in which they occur. In the last decade the National Health Service 
has seen a significant reduction in funding as a result of austerity 
policies. (22)  Consequently, many NHS trusts have found it extremely difficult  
to respond safely and effectively to the crisis, because of lack of resources 
(in terms of people, money, and equipment) –  the absence of sufficient 
personal protective equipment for those treating Covid -19 patients being 
particularly notable. (23)  
The current British government’s  response to Covid-19 therefore deviated 
significantly from those of nations with more successful responses, and from 
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WHO guidance. In doing so, it  established an epistemological and financial  
context where it was difficult for individuals to afford to fol low public health 
guidelines, or to even know exactly what those guidelines required. As I 
argued above, the successful delivery and maintenance of public health 
programmes requires engagement in solidarity from both private individuals,  
and government off icials. Engagement in solidarity by the latter entails  
legislating for the delivery and management of effective public health 
programmes, and providing clear guidance for their constituents to follow.  
Unlike their counterparts in New Zealand and South Korea, the current 
British government has failed to achieve either of these objectives, though i t 
should be noted, that  there have also been high profile instances of individual 
agents in the UK failing to engage in solidarity with their communities. (24)  
However, these solidarity failures must be considered in context; arguably 
some failures of individuals to engage in solidarity may at least in part  be 
attributed to governmental  failures to deliver an effective public health 
response to Covid-19, or communicate i ts importance and requirements. It  
has been noted for example, that  panic -buying and stockpiling can be 
sensible strategies in times of potential social chaos and market disruption –  
especially when told by the government that a total social  lockdow n may 
imminently limit access to necessities. (25)  In each of these cases,  the 
individuals concerned do have duties of solidarity (as well as professional 
duties, in the case of health care workers) to their compatriots and 
communities, and failure to fulfi l them may cause harm. However, the costs 
and challenges of fulfilling those duties have been amplified (and in the case 
of the professional duties of health care workers dangerously so) by the 
government’s failure to fulfil its own responsibilities of sol idari ty.   
Conclusion 
Effective public health programmes cannot rely solely on private individuals 
always engaging in interpersonal solidari ty in an optimal fashion. Private 
citizens all operate under epistemological constraints –  we may not know of 
the needs of others with whom we would engage in solidarity if  we had more 
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complete information, or we may be honestly mistaken about the best way to 
engage in solidarity with people we do know about.  Alternatively,  we may 
know of the needs of others, but face material constraints which make 
providing significant assistance to them impossible. Governments must 
therefore engage in solidarity with their constituents by providing the 
epistemological , institutional, material , and financial resources, which 
compensate for these constraints and thus make interpersonal solidarity 
possible. By failing to do so, the current British government has failed to 
adequately protect the residents of t he United Kingdom in a time of crisis . It  
has thus failed to engage in solidarity with its constituents, and  effectively 
devolved responsibil ity for action to agents with far less power to deliver an 
effective response to Covid-19. Further  and importantly,  those thus tasked 
with responding to the pandemic are disempowered in part  because of the 
failures of the government.  
Had the government’s failures in response to Covid -19 occurred despite the 
early adoption of recommended strategies proven to work elsewhere , they 
would not count as failures of solidarity ,  but of policy –  as unfortunate 
consequences of mistakes made under challenging circumstances, despite a 
good faith effort to achieve the best possible outcome. The government’s 
actions became failures of solidarity when it ignored compelling and 
accessible information about how best to respond to the crisis, and did not 
take actions that  they could and should have taken. Further, by fail ing to 
provide either definitive rules, or sufficient material and financial support ,  
the government devolved responsibility for responding to the crisis to their  
constituents and expected them to each ind ividually act in the correct manner 
to prevent the spread of infection –  an unrealistic expectation. As discussed 
above, private individuals operate under significantly stricter financial ,  
social , and epistemological constraints than th eir elected representatives,  
constraints which in this instance were exacerbated by the actions of those in 
power. Even under ideal conditions (that  is, in the absence of material and 
epistemological constraints),  rel iance on mass individual choices delivering 
an appropriate response to Covid -19 would not be an effective strategy. To 
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rely on such a strategy where such constraints are present is  not only 
mistaken, but arguably avoidably so.  It is  also a dereliction of the 
government’s responsibilities to its constituents.   
Importantly therefore, the government’s actions represent more than mere 
failure to adequately protect  its constituents . By devolving responsibility for 
action to those without sufficient power to act ,  the government’s actions 
should be recognised both as a failure of solidarity,  and as a dereliction it.  
Indeed, where engagement in solidarity by the government has occurred, it  
has frequently been delayed, insufficient, or reluctantly provided , 
contributing to the significant excess mortality and morbidity experienced by 
the UK. (21)  
A government which fails to engage in solidarity with its  constituents,  makes 
an implicit statement about the nature of the relationship between i tself and 
the rest of society.  In doing so, and in abdicating their responsibilities to 
their constituents while simultaneously expecting them to collectively deliver 
an effective response to Covid-19, they redefine that relationship, from being 
one of elected representatives and consti tuents, to one of rulers and ruled.  
There are two ways to interpret the phrase “solidarity is  for other people”; 
first, it  can be read as a statement of closeness and relationality –  an 
expression of the understanding that solidarity is something we engage in to 
assist or benefit other people with whom we identify.  Se cond, it  can be 
understood as an assert ion that the speaker holds themselves apart from other 
people –  a claim that solidarity is something that other people should or may 
do, but that is not something with which the speaker is concerned. Sadly,  
recent events suggest that we must give serious consideration to the idea that  
it  is this second interpretation which more accurately reflects the attitudes of 
the Brit ish government at this time.    
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